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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

: Case No.

930494-CA

v.
DENNIS ANDRE TEIPEL,

: Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for burglary, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990),
and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1990), in
the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did defendant's trial counsel, who reasonably

participated in the selection of the jury, render ineffective
assistance of counsel by not challenging a juror who appears, on
the written record, to have responded ambiguously to the trial
court's voir dire about whether the juror could act impartially
and fairly?

Whether a defendant has received ineffective

assistance of counsel is reviewed as a question of law when
raised for the first time on direct review, State v. Tennyson,

850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App, 1993); however, "appellate review of
counsel's performance must be highly deferential."
2.

Id. at 466.

Did the trial court correctly refuse defendant's request

for a lesser included offense instruction on criminal trespass?
Because a trial court's decision to refuse a jury instruction
presents a question of law, the appellate court reviews that
decision for correctness without affording it any particular
deference.

State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822, 826 (Utah App. 1991);

State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied,
823 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
United States Constitution
AMENDMENT VI
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel
for his defence.
Utah Code Ann. (1990)
§ 58-37a-5. Unlawful acts.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to
possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to
plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process,
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain,
conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce
a controlled substance into the human body in violation
of this chapter. Any person who violates this
subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of
single criminal episode - Included offenses.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense
included in the offense charged but may not be
convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or
2

less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation,
conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the
offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as
a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the
jury with respect to an included offense unless there
is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of
the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or
judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient
evidence to support a conviction for the offense
charged but that there is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for an included offense and the
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for
conviction of that included offense, the verdict or
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and
a judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such
relief is sought by the defendant.
§ 76-6-202.

Burglary*

(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or
remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a
building with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event
it is a felony of the second degree.
§ 76-6-206.

Criminal trespass.

(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means
intrusion of the entire body.
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if,
under circumstances not amounting to burglary as
defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204:
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property
and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any
person or damage to any property, including the use of
graffiti as defined in Subsection 78-11-20(2);
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than

3

theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence
will cause fear for the safety of another; or
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he
enters or remains on property as to which notice
against entering is given by:
(i) personal communication to the actor by the
owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the
owner;
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously
designed to exclude intruders;
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to
come to the attention of intruders.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 23B. Motion to remand for determination of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in
a criminal case may move the court to remand the case
to the trial court for the purpose of entering findings
of fact relevant to a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon an
allegation of facts constituting ineffective assistance
of counsel not fully appearing in the record on appeal.
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the
appellant's brief. Upon a showing of good cause, the
court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing
of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court
permit a motion to be filed after oral argument.
Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at
any time if the claim has been raised and the motion
would have been available to a party.
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content
of the motion shall conform to the requirements of Rule
23. The motion shall include or be accompanied by
affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the
record on appeal that show the claimed deficient
performance of the attorney. The affidavits shall also
allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered
by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient
performance. A response shall be filed within 20 days
after the motion is filed. Any reply shall be filed
within 10 days after the response is filed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Dennis Teipel, was charged by information with

4

burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-202 (1990), and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia,
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5
(1990) (R. 7). Following a jury trial, the defendant was
convicted of both charges (R. 101-02).

The trial court sentenced

defendant to terms of from zero to five years and six months on
each of the offenses, respectively, to be served consecutively.
However, the trial court stayed the sentences and ordered
defendant serve thirty-six months probation with conditions (R.
106-08).

Five months later defendant's probation was revoked as

the result of a different burglary (R. 119, 132-35).
Defendant was initially represented on appeal by Ken Brown,
who filed a brief (Appellant's Br.#l) claiming only that
defendant was denied effective assistance because his trial
counsel failed to challenge a juror for cause. Thereafter,
present counsel was substituted (see district court's minute
entry of December 19, 1994, unpaginated and attached at the end
of the district court's record), and he filed a supplemental
brief (Appellant's Br.#2) claiming the trial court erred in
refusing defendant's request for a lesser included offense.

This

brief is responsive to both claims.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the morning of March 14, 1993, Salt Lake City Police
Officer David Harris was informed of a broken glass door at Big
John's Texaco, located at 830 South State Street in Salt Lake
City (R. 224-25) . Having gone to Big John's and verified that
5

the door glass was broken out, Officer Harris called for
assistance (R. 226) . As he then looked through the store's front
windows, he saw an interior office door open, close, open, and
close again (R. 228) . After two other officers arrived, Harris
and the others entered Big John's, forced their way through the
then-locked office door, and found the defendant hiding in a
closet behind the door (R. 229, 236-37).

While arresting him,

they discovered that he was carrying a syringe and a spoon (R.
234, 253-55)•

Salt Lake Police Detective Gordon Parks testified

that defendant later told him that "he wanted to get something to
eat, and so he went ahead and went in the door and was going to
get some food to eat" (R. 286-87), although no food was found on
defendant (R. 244). The officers also found an oily shoeprint
matching defendant's outside a door whose screen had been pried
up (R. 234, 238).
Pepsi products, beef jerky, nuts, sandwiches, batteries, and
flashlights were missing from the front area of the store (R.
270, 277, 279) . Missing from the office area were a container of
prescription drugs belonging to the owner, some postage stamps,
and some packets of coffee (R. 280-81).

None of the missing

items were recovered (R. 279).
The inside of the premises was in disarray:

plastic bags

lay on the floor by the drink cooler and in the office sink (R.
231-32), the office garbage can had been emptied on the floor (R.
232), and the office desk's drawers had been pulled out (R. 256).
Owner Gerald Bruin left the premises locked and entirely in order
6

the night before (R. 271-72, 274-75).

The store was not open

that day, and no one had permission to enter (R. 268, 273).
Defendant testified that he entered Big John's through the
already-broken window in order to shoot up with cocaine and that
he neither intended to nor actually picked up anything while
inside (R. 296-99) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The standard for showing ineffective assistance of counsel
in failing to challenge an individual juror is whether trial
counsel reasonably participated in the jury selection process.
The record in this case discloses that trial counsel reasonably
participated in jury selection: he twice expressly passed the
panel for cause, struck four potential jurors by peremptory
challenge, and stipulated that five other potential jurors be
excused.
fail.

Defendant's ineffectiveness challenge must therefore

In addition, the record is ambiguous as to whether the

juror which defendant objects to under his ineffectiveness claim
was in fact biased.

Therefore, defendant's ineffectiveness claim

also must fail for failure to demonstrate prejudice.
POINT II
A defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense
instruction only when the evidence establishes a rational basis
for acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense.
152, 158-59 (Utah 1983).

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d

As in Baker, defendant has failed to
7

adduce any evidence, other than his unlawful entering and
remaining in the building, to show that he could have been
convicted of criminal trespass.

Defendant's resort to the corpus

delicti rule to attack the prosecution's argument against giving
the lesser included offense instruction fails because it was not
preserved and it does not apply to the facts of this case.

The

appellate court should not enter a conviction for criminal
trespass because, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5), not only is
the evidence sufficient to convict defendant of burglary, but it
is insufficient to convict him of criminal trespass.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL REASONABLY
PARTICIPATED IN JURY SELECTION, DEFENSE
COUNSEL'S DECLINING TO STRIKE ONE PARTICULAR
PANEL MEMBER DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT.
Defendant's first assertion on appeal is that his trial
counsel was ineffective in not striking prospective jury member
John Killpack, who defendant claims "was clearly prejudiced
against drug users."1 Appellant's Br#l. at 7.
In considering an ineffectiveness of counsel claim raised
for the first time on direct appeal, the standard of review
applied by the appellate court is "whether defendant was deprived
of effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law."
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App. 1993).
1

State v.

However, even

The trial court's voir dire of the juror at issue (R.
188-90) is attached at Addendum A.
8

though the court applies this usually nondeferential standard,
"appellate review of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential" to minimize the "temptation . . . to second-guess
counsel's performance" in hindsight, "on the basis of an
inanimate record."

Id. at 466.

Since ineffectiveness challenges normally cannot be raised
on direct appeal, State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 953 (Utah
App. 1993), aff'd, 256 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah 1994), the Court
is presented with the threshold question whether it can hear
defendant's claim on this point. An appellant may bring an
ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal if there is new counsel on
appeal and "the trial record is adequate to permit determination
of the issue."

Id. at 953; State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027,

1029 (Utah 1991).

A record is adequate when "[the appellate

court is] not aware of any evidence or argument which might be
made that is not now before [the court]."

Id. at 1029.

Defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal, and the record
is adequate to evaluate defendant's claim.
In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient by identifying specific acts or omissions which, under
the circumstances of the particular case, demonstrate that
"'counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.'"

State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah

1990) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)).

Second, defendant must establish the

9

prejudice prong by "affirmatively show[ing] that a reasonable
probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, the
result would have been different."
909, 913 (Utah 1988) .

State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d

"Defendant has the burden of demonstrating

that counsel's 'performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment,' and that counsel's actions
were not conscious trial strategy."

State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d

170, 174 (Utah App. 1992).
This Court recently addressed an ineffectiveness of counsel
claim in the context of jury selection in State v. Cosev, 873
P.2d 1177 (Utah App. 1994).

In that case, the defendant asserted

that his counsel was ineffective for not challenging a jury panel
member who had worked as a diversion officer at both the Salt
Lake City Police Department and the Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Department, and whose statements the defendant said "clearly
showed bias."

Id. at 1179. However, the Court held that "absent

some showing that trial counsel has failed to reasonably
participate in the selection of jurors, . . . an ineffective
assistance claim premised on the failure to challenge any
particular juror for cause cannot 'overcome the strong
presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate assistance and
exercised reasonable professional judgment' in the selection
process."

Id. at 1180 (quoting State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,

159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990)).
Underlying the "reasonable participation" standard
established by the Cosey court was its recognition that its
10

"review of counsel's performance 'is inherently hampered by our
necessary reliance on only the lifeless transcript to assess the
dynamic and highly judgmental process of jury selection.'"
Cosey, 873 P.2d at 1179-80. Unable to view in the cold record
"demeanor or other intangible characteristics" of jurors, the
court "could only speculate" about counsel's thoughts regarding
any one potential juror, and

ff

[s]uch speculation is manifestly

inappropriate, given the strong presumption that counsel's
behavior was the product of trial strategy rather than
ineptitude."

Id. at 1179-80.

See State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d

949, 954 (Utah App. 1993) (noting that counsel may have declined
to challenge jurors because counsel believed that juror responses
did not rise to level justifying for-cause challenge, or may have
had some "other intangible reason for wanting them on the jury,
such as attentiveness, education, or assertiveness"); Tennyson,
850 P.2d at 468-69 (citing with approval cases finding
ineffective assistance only when no conceivable legitimate tactic
or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions); State v.
Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579-80 (Utah App. 1993) (same).
The record in this case demonstrates that defense counsel
reasonably participated in the jury selection process.

Counsel

twice expressly passed the jury panel for cause (R. 191, 200) .
Defense counsel exercised all four of his peremptory challenges-notably, one of the prospective jurors so stricken immediately
followed Mr. Killpack on the jury list (R. 21). While it is
impossible to know counsel's reasons for excluding these jurors,
11

there were plausible reasons for most of them:

Ms. Wright had

previously been a member of a jury which rendered a guilty
verdict, and also had a brother-in-law who was a county sheriff
(R. 167, 177); Ms. Newton had a neighbor who was a police officer
(R. 178); several friends of Mr. Ketchum's were judges (R. 179),
and his father's business had once been robbed (R. 175).
Besides the peremptory challenges exercised by defense
counsel, an additional five persons were excused from the jury
panel pursuant to stipulation between counsel (R. 20, 200).
While defense counsel and the prosecutor did not make express
their reasons for excusing these panel members, for each there
were reasons why defense counsel might not want them on the jury:
Ms. Smith's father was a retired policeman who had been involved
in similar kinds of cases (R. 173). Ms. Pesely and Ms. Jones
taught many students who had been involved in the same type of
cases and indicated they would have problems deciding the case in
a fair and unbiased manner (R. 174, 176) . In response to a later
question by the court whether they could decide the case without
regard to preconceived notions, Ms. Pesely responded "I would
hope that I could, but I'm not sure;" Ms. Jones said, "I don't
think I could" (R. 181-82).

While there was some indication that

Michael Peck had been involved in drug abuse, he also explained
that his grandfather died of alcohol poisoning (R. 190).
Finally, Tracey Nelson was just one year out of high school,
managed a pizza parlor (R. 153) and had recently been involved in
a criminal proceeding against her father (R. 171).
12

Defense counsel thus acted affirmatively in the jury
selection process, using peremptory challenges to remove jurors
who he apparently did not feel could be challenged for cause, but
whom he did not want on the jury.

He also, together with the

prosecution, excused a group of jurors each of whom possessed
qualities competent defense counsel might strategically wish to
avoid.

He twice expressly passed the panel for cause.

This

record shows defense counsel to have reasonably participated in
the jury selection process; therefore, defendant's
ineffectiveness claim must fail under Cosey.
Alternatively, this Court should deny defendant's
ineffectiveness claim because the record simply does not disclose
a clear prejudice or bias on the part of Mr. Killpack.

As a

result, the prejudice prong of Strickland has not been satisfied.
Though defendant characterizes Mr. Killpack as "clearly
prejudiced against drug users," Appellant's Br.#l at 7, the
record is ambiguous as to what Mr. Killpack's feelings towards
drug users were.

While he initially indicated that he had

"strong feelings"' that would make him unable to sit in judgment
in a fair and unbiased manner (R. 188-89), he did not indicate
whether those feelings would tend to favor or disfavor drug
users.

His description of an admired ex-uncle who "got involved

with drugs" and whose "life [was] flushed," (R. 189), is as
consistent with sympathy for the drug user's suffering as with
prejudice against drug users in general.

Furthermore, after the

court clarified the context of the trial and asked a follow-up
13

question, Mr. Killpack unequivocally indicated that he could
decide the case in a fair and unbiased manner (R. 189).
The basis of defendant's challenge, however, concerns the
end of the colloquy between the trial court and Mr. Killpack:
THE COURT: . . . . Considering it from that
perspective, could you set aside any feelings
you might have and decide this case
objectively and in a fair and unbiased
manner?
MR. KILLPACK: Yes.
THE COURT:

Do you think so?

MR. KILLPACK:

I would hope so.

THE COURT: Are you sure?
MR. KILLPACK:

Not totally.

THE COURT: All right. Anyone else? Ms.
Huntsman?
It is apparent that " [n]ot totally" does not signal any
genuine doubt about being fair and impartial on the juror's part
because if it did, the trial court would not have summarily
discontinued the clarification process it was then engaged in.
See Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 469 (refusal to challenge for cause or
use a peremptory against a juror who said only that he could
"probably" be fair to both sides was not ineffective, and citing
with approval Pale v. State, 807 S.W.2d 538, 541-42 (Mo. App.
1991), where juror in a rape case said he "[p]robably would" be
able to set aside sister-in-law's rape, decision not to challenge
was not ineffective assistance).

Evidently the court--and

defense counsel—were satisfied that Mr. Killpack's response
merely indicated a normal hesitancy to give an absolute answer,
14

and that he could indeed be impartial.

See State v. Brooks, 868

P.2d 818, 822 (Utah App. 1994) ("The scope of the voir dire
inquiry is left to the sound discretion of the trial court
because only the trial court knows when it is satisfied that a
prospective juror is impartial.").
Even if this Court regards the juror's response as
ambiguous, given the "strong presumption that trial counsel
rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable
professional judgment' in the selection process," Cosey, 873 P.2d
at 1180, this Court should find that trial counsel's failure to
challenge Mr. Killpack was not prejudicial to defendant as
required by Strickland.
In sum, the record in this case discloses that counsel
reasonably participated in.jury selection.

Defendant has not

overcome the strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment, and
his ineffectiveness claim must fail.

Alternatively, the record

does not show that the juror in question was in fact prejudiced
to the extent that he could have been challenged for cause;
therefore, the ineffectiveness claim should fail under the second
prong of Strickland.
Finally, even if this Court should determine that the record
is not adequate to evaluate defense counsel's reasons for not
challenging juror Killpack, his claim should still be rejected.
See Garrett, 849 P.2d at 581-82 (rejecting claim of ineffective
assistance where record found to be inadequate to rebut the
15

presumption that defense counsel rendered effective assistance).
Considering defense counsel's participation in jury selection
generally and the doubtfulness that the questioned juror's
remarks signalled a prejudicial attitude against defendant,
defendant has not overcome the presumption that his counsel's
actions were not the result of conscious trial strategy.
Moreover, defendant has not alleged facts outside the record in
support of a remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

See Garrett, 84 9 P.2d at 851 (holding that remand

under rule 23B for a "fishing expedition" would be improper where
the motion would not be available for lack of assertion of nonrecord facts).
In sum, on the ground that defendant has failed to
demonstrate that his trial counsel's refusal to challenge juror
Killpack constituted ineffective assistance, this Court should
reject his claim.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST FOR A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
INSTRUCTION BECAUSE THERE EXISTS NO EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR CRIMINAL TRESPASS
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his
request for a lesser included offense instruction on criminal
trespass, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of intent
to commit a theft was insufficient and that there was evidence
supporting his conviction for criminal trespass.
Defendant's claim is disposed of under State v. Baker, the
seminal case in Utah on the criteria for considering a lesser
16

included offense instruction.

The trial court must first

determine if the offense sought is a lesser included offense of
the crime charged, that is, "whether the offense is established
by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the crime charged,ff

State v. Baker,

671 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1983) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1402(3) (a)).

If so, and "the evidence is ambiguous and

susceptible to alternative explanations," the court must instruct
on the lesser included offense if any one of the alternative
interpretations provides both a rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting
him of the included offense. Id. at 157-58.
"This standard does not require the court to weigh the
credibility of the evidence, a function reserved for the trier of
fact."

Id. at 159.

The reviewing court analyzes the evidence

and inferences to be drawn from it in a light most favorable to
the defendant.

State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah 1986).

Notwithstanding this defense oriented standard, defendant's
claim fails, as a'comparison with Baker demonstrates.

In Baker,

the defendant was found hiding inside a gas station which he had
broken into.

His defense was that due to intoxication he could

not form the intent to steal; nonetheless, he was convicted of
burglary.

Id. at 159.

The supreme court rejected his claim that

he should have been given a lesser included offense instruction
on criminal trespass because the defendant failed not only to
introduce a "sufficient quantum of evidence" that he lacked the
17

intent to steal, but also because he did "not address the
separate and distinct element necessary for criminal trespass."
Id. at 160 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4)).
Defendant is guilty of the same error in this case.

In

support of his claim he cites a portion of the criminal trespass
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (1990).2

Defendant's

unlawful entering and remaining on the premises, an element of
criminal trespass overlapping with burglary, is undisputed.
However, the criminal trespass statute also requires a showing of
(1) intent to either cause annoyance or injury, (2) intent to
commit any crime other than a theft or a felony or (3)
recklessness as to whether his presence cause fear for the safety
of another.

Neither at trial3 nor on appeal has defendant

identified or argued any evidence of the necessary intent
2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (1990), cited by defendant,
provides:
(2) A person is guilty of criminal
trespass if, under circumstances not
amounting to burglary as defined in Section
76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204:
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on
property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or
injury to any person or damage to any
property, including the use of graffiti as
defined in Subsection 78-11-20(2);
(ii) intends to commit any crime,
other than theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his
presence will cause fear for the safety of
another[.] [Emphasis added.]
3

Argument on defendant's request for a lesser included
offense instruction and the trial court's ruling (R. 325-28) is
attached at Addendum B.
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elements that would support his conviction for criminal trespass.
Defendant acknowledges that he was guilty of something,
Appellant's Br.#2 at 5, but he has simply failed to inform this
Court of what that something is. For this reason alone his claim
must fail.
Neglecting this critical showing, defendant directs his
challenge4 to attacking the prosecution's argument against the
lesser included offense instruction, which was adopted by the
trial court:

Defendant claimed he entered the premises to shoot

up with cocaine; however, it is a felony to possess or use
cocaine.5

Therefore, a criminal trespass instruction was

precluded by the statute (R. 325-26).6

On appeal, defendant

argues that since the only independent evidence of his intent to
commit the felony is his own statement, such evidence is
unavailable under the corpus delicti rule, and therefore, the

4

Defendant also argues that the evidence of his intent to
commit a theft was doubtful because there was no evidence that
defendant had taken anything from the building. Appellant's
Br.#2 at 3. However, defendant's presence on premises, which
were indisputably broken into and from which property was
indisputably stolen, is circumstantial evidence rebutting
defendant's argument. Also, Detective Parks testified that
defendant told him that he entered the premises to get something
to eat (R. 286-87).
5

See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(b)(i)(D), -8(2)(a)(i),
(b)(ii) (Supp. 1993) (collectively making use or possession of
cocaine a third degree felony).
6

There are, of course, other grounds under the statute for
establishing criminal trespass. However, the prosecution argued
only a single ground for rejecting the requested instruction.
Defendant did not argue alternative grounds or evidence to
support his request in response to the prosecution's argument,
through his testimony or in closing.
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prosecution's argument should fail.

This argument is misplaced

for several reasons.
First, defendant failed to preserve an argument based on the
corpus delicti rule at trial.

State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359

(Utah App. 1993) (defendant's failure to properly raise issue
below waives appellate review).7
Second, even if defendant's resort to the corpus delicti
rule was well-taken, it would only nullify the prosecution's
argument.

It would not provide the missing element for criminal

trespass, the fundamental flaw in his argument generally.
Third, application of the corpus delicti rule does not serve
defendant.

Defendant correctly cites Utah caselaw for the

proposition that "'[a]n admission or a confession, without some
independent corroborative evidence of the corpus delicti, cannot
alone support a guilty verdict.'"

Appellant's Br.#2 at 4 (citing

State v. Hansen, 857 P.2d 978, 980 (Utah App. 1993) (citation
omitted)).

Assuming, arguendo, that the State lacked such

independent evidence, it would serve only to nullify the
prosecution's argument.

Again, it would not supply the missing

element of intent to commit some offense other than a felony or a
theft, necessary to convict defendant for criminal trespass.
Moreover, the rule does not even apply to the prosecution's

7

Exceptions to the general rule of waiver allow reviewing
courts to consider an issue for the first time on appeal if "the
trial court committed plain error or the case involves
exceptional circumstances." Brown, 856 P.2d at 359. Defendant
does not argue either of these exceptions nor does the record
support them.
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use of it in this case.

Provo City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d

437, 441 (Utah App. 1993) ("'The purpose of the rule [is] to
safeguard against convicting the innocent on the strength of
false confessions.'") (citations omitted).

The prosecution did

not use defendant's statement as evidence to convict him of any
offense.

Defendant had not even been charged with possession of

cocaine.

Rather, the prosecution used it to defeat defendant's

request for a lesser included offense instruction.

Defendant has

cited no case in which the corpus delicti rule would be
applicable in such a circumstance.
Finally, the corpus delicti rule is directed against the
prosecution's use of uncorroborated statements.

Provo City

Corp., 861 P.2d at 441 ("Before a defendant's inculpatory
statements can be introduced as evidence against defendant, the
[prosecution] must prove the occurrence of a crime, i.e., a
corpus delicti.").

In this case, however, defendant introduced

the incriminating statement.

Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,

520 (Utah 1994) (finding that the defendant's use of statements
at trial and objection to them on appeal an "inconsistency [that]
smacks of invited error, which is 'procedurally unjustified and
viewed with disfavor'") (citations omitted).
Defendant concludes by requesting that this Court find there
exists a rational basis for his conviction of criminal trespass
and enter a conviction based on the insufficiency of evidence to
establish defendant's intent to commit a theft. Appellant's
Br.#2 at 6.
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An appellate court may set aside a verdict and enter a
judgment of conviction on the lesser offense if it determines
that there is "insufficient evidence to support a conviction for
the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that
included offense . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1995).
Based on the foregoing argument, defendant has failed to
meet the statutory requirements, and his request for relief
should be denied.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, defendant's convictions for
burglary and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia should be
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

St?

day of April, 1995.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

"'KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

CLASSES ON CONTRACT AND CONSTRUCTION LAW.
THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

ANYONE ELSE? MS.

WINGERT?
MS. WINGERT:
THE COURT:

I WAS A BUSINESS LAW CLASS ONCE.
UP AT THE "U"?

MS. WINGERT:

NO.

THE COURT:

OKAY.

AT WEBER STATE.
MRS. HUNTSMAN, DID I SEE

YOUR HAND UP?
MS. HUNTSMAN:
THE COURT:

NO.

ALL RIGHT.

ANYONE ELSE?

THE

RECORD SHOULD INDICATE THERE IS NO FURTHER FURTHER
FURTHER SHOWING OF HANDS.
THE COURT:

DO ANY OF YOU HAVE ANY MORAL,

RELIGIOUS, PHILOSOPHICAL, OR OTHER REASONS THAT WOULD
PROHIBIT YOU OR PREVENT YOU FROM SITTING IN JUDGEMENT OF
ANOTHER PERSON?

IF SO, INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HAND.

THE RECORD SHOULD INDICATE THERE IS NO SHOWING OF HANDS.
AS I INDICATED TO YOU, ONE OF THE CHARGES IN
THIS CASE, TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS PLED NOT GUILTY AND
FOR WHICH HE IS PRESUMED INNOCENT, IS THE UNLAWFUL
POSSESSION OF DRUG -PERIPHRENALIA, A CLASS B. MISDEMEANOR.
MR. KILLPACK:
THE COURT:

VERY STRONG FEELINGS.

ABOUT THE POSSESSION OR USE OF

DRUGS?
MR. KILPACK:

YES.
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THE COURT:

SUCH STRONG FEELINGS THAT WOULD

CAUSE YOU TO BE UNABLE TO DECIDE A CASE WHERE CHARGES ARE
MADE CONCERNING THOSE THINGS, CHARGES THAT ARE YET
UNPROVED, OR FEELINGS THAT WOULD CAUSE YOU TO BE UNABLE
TO SIT IN JUDGMENT IN A FAIR AND UNBIASED MANNER WHEN
THOSE ARE THE KINDS OF CHARGES?

IF SO, RAISE YOUR HAND.

MR. KILLPACK, WHY IS THAT?
MR. KILPACK:

I HAD AN EX-UNCLE THAT WAS MY

HERO, SO TO SAY, AND HE GOT INVOLVED WITH DRUGS.
SAW HIS LIFE BE FLUSHED.

AND I

AND THAT COULD AFFECT MY

JUDGMENT.
THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

YOU TOLD US ABOUT THAT

PERSONAL EXPERIENCE THEN?
MR. KILPACK:
THE COURT:

RIGHT.
WHAT WE HAVE IN THIS COURTROOM IS

AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT PERSONAL EXPERIENCE, DIFFERENT
FACTS, DIFFERENT EVIDENCE.

WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER THE

CHARGE WILL BE PROVED OR NOT PROVED.
CONSIDERING IT FROM THAT PERSPECTIVE, COULD YOU
SET ASIDE ANY FEELINGS YOU MIGHT HAVE AND DECIDE THIS
CASE OBJECTIVELY AND IN A FAIR AND UNBIASED MANNER?
MR. KILPACK:
THE COURT:
MR. KILPACK:
THE COURT:

YES.
DO YOU THINK SO? _
I WOULD HOPE SO.
ARE YOU SURE?
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1

MR. KILPACK:

2

THE COURT:

3

NOT TOTALLY.
ALL RIGHT.

ANYONE ELSE?

MS.

HUNTSMAN?

4 I

MS. HUNTSMAN:

MY SISTER-IN-LAW DIED OF A DRUG

5

OVERDOSE THIS TIME LAST YEAR.

I DON'T KNOW IF THAT

6

THEY WERE PRESCRIPTION DRUGS.

I DON'T KNOW IF THAT WOULD

7

IN ANY WAY AFFECT —

8

THE COURT:

9

ALL RIGHT.

~

AGAIN, YOU'RE

DISCLOSING A PERSONAL EXPERIENCE, BAGGAGE THAT'S SIMILAR

10

TO WHAT ALL OF US BRING INTO THE COURTROOM.

11

SET THAT ASIDE AND NOT LET THAT AFFECT IN ANY WAY YOUR

12

DECISIONS IN THIS CASE?

13

MS. HUNTSMAN:

14

THE COURT:

15
16

YES.

COULD YOU

I THINK SO.

ALL RIGHT.

ANYONE ELSE?

MR.

PECK.
MR. PECK:

I HAVE BEEN DRUG— IN DRUG ABUSE,

17

AND MY GRANDFATHER DIED OF ALCOHOL POISONING.

18

IMPAIR MY JUDGMENT TOWARD THAT PERIPHRENALIA CHARGE

19

BROUGHT UP AGAINST HIM.

20

THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

21

(NO RESPONSE)

22

THE COURT:

23

IS NO FURTHER SHOWING OF HANDS.

THAT WOULD

ANYONE ELSE?

THE RECORD SHOULD INDICATE THERE

24

MR. PECK, YOU SAY IT WOULD NOT?

25

MR. PECK:

IT WOULD.
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ADDENDUM B

THE COURT:
MTr;cTf,r,.

W

n i

IJ0T

AND 27 THROUGH 40.

SO WE ARE

r.IVK ANYTHING NUMBERED 23 THROUGH 26?

MR. YBARRA:
MR. ANDERSON:

WE ADDED--

DO YOU HAVE A 27,

•p

THE COURT:

T

n

™'

£J «

-

1'OU'VE GOT THEM ALL.
THE rniivi'

THE CLERK
THE COURT

ALWAYS RIGHT TODAY.
NOW
CORRECT

COUNSEL

MISSING .

HROUGH

ME MAK- : RECORD, AND ' "

Mb.1 C.i J l l.''I1

~:1

:LVS

./.. 1. • r • t. I.. 11] S C U S i ! Ilk"! "'<' ^ h1'.."' F C» '.'• ElJ f E T 1.' 71 K

" Tr UGHT THAT WE HAD A SET TO WHICH THERE WERE

THEN
£i:r..E THERE '

r
:-'. EVIDENCE

DMISSIC

H-;

THE INTEND
CONTROLLED SUBSTANC
LESSER-INCLUDED OF

V ^ A
E

INFRACTION OR CLASS

IT WAS THE POSITION <~
BECAUSE THE FELONY STATUTE
"N I'fh "F Hu,L.fet'SK l"N, TH

STATED

HAT

^NDERSC
ISJUNCTIVE
YBARRA
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1

NOT APPROPRIATE, AND THAT IS, HE HAD ALREADY COMMITTED

2

THE CRIME IN QUESTION, THE FELONY, BY HIS POSSESSING IT,

3

AND THE USE OF IT WAS MERELY A CONTINUUM OF THE CRIME

4

THAT HE HAD ALREADY COMMITTED, AND HE CERTAINLY CAN'T BE

5

PROSECUTED FOR ONE MORE THAN ONE CRIME FOR THAT.

6

MR. YBARRA GOES ONE STEP FURTHER, THEN, AND

7

SEEKS TO AMEND THE INFORMATION WHICH SPECIFICALLY

8

FREMISES THE ELEMENT OF THE BURGLARY ON AN ENTRY WITH

9

INTENT TO COMMIT A THEFT, RATHER THAN THE MORE

10
11

GENERALIZED LANGUAGE OF INTENT TO COMMIT A FELONY.
HE WISHES TO AMEND TO INCLUDE THE MORE GENERAL

12

LANGUAGE OF INTENT TO COMMIT A FELONY OR COMMIT A THEFT.

13

OR INTENT TO COMMIT A FELONY.

14

MR. ANDERSON'S POSITION IS THAT TO DO SO WOULD

15

BE PREJUDICIAL AT THIS POINT IN THE TRIAL; THAT IF THIS

16

WAS DONE, THAT AMENDMENT WOULD HAVE HAD TO HAVE BEEN MADE

17

BEFORE THE OPENING STATEMENT, IN WHICH MR. ANDERSON TAKES

18

THE POSITION AND THEREAFTER PUTS ON EVIDENCE THAT HE WENT

19

IN TO USE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.

20

THOSE ARE THE ISSUES, AS I UNDERSTAND THEM.

21

AND IF I HAVE NOT ARTICULATED THEM PROPERLY, FROM YOUR

22

PERSPECTIVE—

23

MR. YBARRA:

I BELIEVE YOU HAVE PROPERLY

24

ARTICULATED THAT.

ONE MINOR THING FOR THE RECORD HERE,

25

THAT IS, IS DEFINITION OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS 76-6-206
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INDICATES THAT A PERSON I" OUT!.?" CF "FTMINAL TRESPASS
1STANCES NOT AMOUNTING
DEFINED

. : . ••

-..

r

'

BURGLARY AS

.

IS

PARTICULAR CASE WE BELIEVE TH* ' I •• •"•!=. JUhi WERE TO
'
TESTIFIED

.

•:

...

•:: I :-.'••: :. :-

-

;••• ••". •" CTIONS

WOULD AMOU;

*

;>l: Ku.iRGl

:

. . : „-

AS HE'S

... -

\ MATTE:-

F LAV; I N

DETERMINUii' WIIKTHIT IT1" APPROPRIATE TO GIVE A LESSER
INCLUDED OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS.
THE COURT:

MR. ANDERSON, DO YOU NEED TO

t:;uppLEM.
:l
••\RACTERIZED

\NDERSON:
'

I BELIEVE YOU HAVE ACCUhA'mLi

OBJECTION.

-.'

:.

MAKE IT CLEAR,
-•ru.TPED

OFFEICS:

STATED

' FOR THE

ROUNDS THAT

REFER TO.

COURT WAS.
T
CORRECT ON

AND THAT MR. YBARR;

~"SITIOH IS

LESSER

LESSER-INCLUDED, BUT

HE
I U>

)ENYING THE REQUEST TO AMEND

ANGUAGJ

•

• GENERAL THAN

SPECIFIC, FOR THE REASON STATEL
AND THAT

IT WOULD BE UNFAIR AND
WOULD HAVE PRESENTED THE

)

CASE DIFFERENTLY AND PRESENTED A DIFFERENT THEORY OR
PRESENTED NO THEORY.
SO NOW, HAVING MADE THOSE OBJECTIONS, MR.
ANDERSON, DO YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER OBJECTIONS TO THE
INSTRUCTIONS?
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

I DO NOT, YOUR HONOR.
ALL RIGHT.

MR. YBARRA, I MADE A

RECORD THAT YOU WANT TO AMEND, AND I'M NOT ALLOWING THAT.
MR. YBARRA:
THE COURT:

I HAVE NO OTHER OBJECTION.
OKAY.

CAN WE BRING THE JURY IN

NOW AND INSTRUCT THEM, AND HAVE CLOSING STATEMENTS?
MR. YBARRA:
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

YES, YOUR HONOR.
YES.
I'LL READ FAST.

LISTEN, I ASKED

THEM IF THEY HAD MADE A TENTATIVE DECISION, AND THEY WANT
TO COME BACK IN THE MORNING IF THEY GO PAST 5:15.

SO

THEY WANT TO COME BACK IN THE MORNING AS EARLY AS
POSSIBLE.
SO -- WELL JUST BRING THEM BACK, IF IT'S ALL
RIGHT WITH YOU, WE'LL JUST HAVE THE BAILIFF SWORN IN
TONIGHT, WE'LL INSTRUCT THEM NOT TO DISCUSS THE CASE,
ACTUALLY GIVE THEM THE CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION WITH THIS
ELABORATION THAT YOU ARE TO SHOW UP HERE AT A TIME
CERTAIN IN THE MORNING, YOU WILL AN ASSEMBLE OUT IN FRONT
OF THE JURY ROOM, AND WHEN YOUR ALL ASSEMBLED, MR.
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